In the Consolation of Ontology, Czech poet-philosopher Egon Bondy examines the substantial model of reality — the notion that there is some sort of substance, some "thing", idea, being, or principle that creates, underlies, transcends, or gives meaning to the universe in which we live. He shows how the substantial model, in both its theistic and mechanical materialist versions, is logically untenable and dangerous in its consequences. From there, Bondy shows how the nonsubstantial alternative — prefigured in the thinking of (...) cultures that developed independently of Greece — is simpler and more logically consistent. More importantly, it is free from the negative consequences of the substantial model and instead opens the way toward genuine human freedom, creativity, and responsibility, toward a corresponding and supportive form of social organization, and toward an unclouded understanding of ontological reality. Previously untranslated, the book asks that we leave behind comfortable assumptions and understand how the struggles for a genuinely human future and for ontological clarity presuppose each other and are mutually interdependent. (shrink)

This work resulted from a conference held in 2003 that was jointly sponsored by the Rockefeller Archive Center and Quinnipiac University. Drawing upon perspectives from history, philosophy, and the social sciences, as well as public health and medicine, the authors in this volume examine and critique the role of Foundations, most prominently the Rockefeller Foundation, in promoting and expanding the development of Western medicine around the world during the 20th century. The first half of the book examines the historical involvement (...) of philanthropic foundations in public heath, basic medical research, and related social and political issues. These studies range from an examination of the Rockefeller's Foundation's anti-malaria campaigns to the involvement of Foundations in promoting eugenic ideology and population control. The second half of the book considers current situations in which philanthropic foundations are active in promoting public health and westernized medicine, including consideration of the fight against AIDS in Africa, the resurgence of tuberculosis as a major public health threat, and the ongoing war against malaria. Finally, the book concludes with thoughts on the future of health, disease, and public health by Peter C. Goldmark, Jr., a former president of the Rockefeller Foundation. By considering issues of public health and health policy from a wide range of perspectives, this book seeks to contribute both to our understanding of the past successes and failures of growing dominance of Westernized medicine over global health, and to consider present and future possibilities for improving the delivery of health services to the population of the world. (shrink)

This paper argues that the health-related work of the RockefellerFoundation in Central Europe following the First World War flowed not somuch from geopolitical concerns as from the Foundation's ambition tocreate a global network in scientific medicine. It examines theassumptions and values that underpinned this project, and indicates someof the questions that these pose for today's world.

Heidegger was rector of Freiburg University from April 21, 1933, until sometime in March 1934. Soon after becoming rector, he joined the Nazi Party and devoted much energy and personal initiative to the implementation of Nazi programs in his university. A documentary record of this year is collected in Guido Schneeberger's Nachlese zu Heidegger. Of Schneeberger's 217 documents, 41 contain actual texts by Heidegger or reports of things he said. Thus there is room for useful editing. In the present "translation," (...) Runes unsuccessfully undertakes this task. He retains just 17 of the Schneeberger documents; eight of these contain words by Heidegger. Or perhaps one should say words by Runes, for the mutilated translation does even less credit to Heidegger than the brown clichés that pervade the original. No page is free from such mistranslations as "outdated" for "vollendet," "the State" for "die Stätte," "adherence to tradition" for "Wille zum Wesen," "kiss good-bye" for "einbüßen," "old people's home" for "Elternhaus." In eight different places the word "Hitler" has been inserted. On page 22, e.g., Runes has added his own "Heil Hitler" to Heidegger's signature. Thus, though many of the general facts can be gleaned from this book, it is not reliable as far as detail is concerned. And of course it shares with the original Schneeberger documentation the limitation of giving no hint as to Heidegger's Nazi activities, if any, after early 1934.—J. B. B. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Estudio sobre el alcance de la concepción del pensamiento hispanoamericano en José Gaos, en su obra de los años 40. A History of Latin American Philosophy (s. XVI- XIX): / José Gaos (1900-1969).

The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 244-250, June 2015.

Excerpt from Der Gesetzesbegriff Beim Hl; Thomas von Aquin im Lichte des Rechtsstudiums Seiner Zeit Es war der Name des hl. Thomas von Aquin, der da von Juristen öfters wegen seiner Bedeutung für die juridische Wissenschaft zitiert wurde. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst (...) repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Excerpt from The New Realism: Coöperative Studies in Philosophy On July 21, 1910, we published a brief article entitled 'The Program and First Platform of Six Realists,' in which we indicated the direction philosophical inquiry ought to take. We there asserted that advance would be facilitated by cooperative investigations; and the drafting of the platform was a first attempt to confirm this belief. The present volume continues, on a larger scale, the work there inaugurated; and we hope it will be (...) followed by other collections of studies. The introductory essay voices our common opinions. The other essays do so only in part. It has seemed best to publish them without laboring for complete unanimity, inasmuch as their agreements quite overshadow their differences. They have been written after prolonged conferences. A few important debatable topics are briefly discussed by dissenting members in the Appendix. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

As originally planned this volume was meant to cover a somewhat wider scope than, in fact, it has turned out to do. When, in rg68, I initially conceived of preparing it, it was proposed to deal with several aspects of early modern scepticism, in addition to the fortuna of the Academica, and to publish various loosely related pieces under the title of 'Studies in the History of Early Modern Scepticism. ' Thereby, I foresaw that I would exhaust my knowledge of (...) the subject and would then be able to turn my attention to other matters. In initiating my research on this topic, however, I soon found that there remained a much greater bulk of material to study than could possibly be dealt with between the covers of the single modest volume which I envisioned. My proposed section on Cicero's Academica was to cover between 50 and 75 pages in the original plan. It soon became apparent, however, especially after Joannes Rosa's hitherto unstudied commentary on Cicero's work was uncovered, that this material would have to be treated at a much greater length than I had foreseen. The present volume is the result of this expanded investigation. The monograph which has come from this alteration in plans has, I think, the virtues of continuity and cohesive ness and one hopes that these advantages offset the benefits of a broader scope which were sacrificed. (shrink)

The _Second Treatise_ is one of the most important political treatises ever written and one of the most far-reaching in its influence. In his provocative 15-page introduction to this edition, the late eminent political theorist C. B. Macpherson examines Locke's arguments for limited, conditional government, private property, and right of revolution and suggests reasons for the appeal of these arguments in Locke's time and since.

This fifty-page essay treats Marx's concept of action as the principle underlying his whole system. Activity for Marx is described as both a philosophical concept and an element of human experience demanded by his system. The principle of activity is present as early as in Marx's doctoral dissertation and its influence is traced on his materialism, epistemology, and conception of philosophy. In the process, some strong similarities are shown with Dewey's concept of action, despite the difference in goals of (...) the two philosophers. The concept of action was not original with Marx as the author demonstrates in his discussion of Kant's epistemology and Hegel's dialectics. What distinguishes Marx's concept of action is the unification of theory and practice, and the interrelationship of the two on a materialist foundation. To Marx, there was no meaningful theory without practice and no effective action without theory. Furthermore, the oft-quoted statement by Marx that philosophers have only interpreted the world whereas the point is to change it asserts only half of the case. Marx is not advocating change for the sake of change or change in accordance with any interpretation of the world. He is proposing change of a very specific kind and his concept of action cannot be separated from its content. This point does not emerge as clearly as it should in the essay under consideration because the author tends to treat the concept of activity in isolation and as an uninfluenced influence on the rest of Marx's thought. The author welcomes Marx's emphasis on practice as a much-needed antidote to the trend that makes philosophy a world apart. He also approves Marx's active personal role in society and his unhesitating entry into debate with the finest minds of his time. Of great value to those interested in the young Marx is the author's translation of Marx's doctoral dissertation on The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. This is the first complete translation to appear in English. It occupies half the space of the present volume.--H. B. (shrink)

On Death, by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara, is among the most significant philosophical treatments of the theme surviving from the Greco-Roman world. The author was an influential figure in first-century B.C.E. Roman society, associated with poets such as Virgil and politicians such as the father-in-law of Julius Caesar. The surviving copies of his treatises were carbonized following the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 C.E. This edition contains the Greek text, newly reconstituted with the help of the infrared imaging (...) technology that has revolutionized the study of Philodemus’s works in the twenty-first century, and completely translated into English for the first time. An extensive introduction provides background on Philodemus and his writings, accompanying notes enrich the text, and forty-four pages of photographs illustrate the papyrus manuscript from which the translation is drawn. (shrink)

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

This is a new translation of one of Plekhanov's major works on historical materialism. It is based on the Russian edition of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, edited by V. A. Fomina. The appendix contains two valuable additional essays by Plekhanov: The Materialist Conception of History and The Role of the Individual in History, both of which are reprints with some minor revisions of translations of 1940. Plekhanov's footnotes are given on the (...) class='Hi'>page and explanatory notes by the editor have been added in the back of the book. Plekhanov is generally credited with having been the first to apply the term "dialectical materialism" to the philosophical materialism of Marx and Engels. In the opinion of many non-Marxist and some Marxist scholars, this was the crucial initial step in the elaboration of a deviationist doctrine which not only departed from Marx's and Engels' original thought, but which eventually overshadowed it. Plekhanov, in this view, served as the link between Engels and Lenin in which a tendency in Engels toward a mechanistic materialism, manifested in his Anti-Dühring and The Dialectics of Nature, was developed into a dominant theme. Dialectical materialism became the term applicable to the science of the laws of motion of man, society, and nature--of all reality. Historical materialism, or, as Marx and Engels called it, the materialist conception of history, became but a subordinate branch of dialectical materialism, dealing specifically with the laws of motion of man and society. It became a philosophy of history derived from a broader philosophy of nature, or of the cosmos. Reality became an autonomous existent--independent of the human species. And epistemology became a copy theory of man's never-ending and never-achieved struggle to know and reflect that which pre-exists outside of him. Regrettably, the introduction by the editor ignores these evaluations and interpretations and sticks to the more traditional Marxist areas of discussing Plekhanov's masterful refutation of economic determinism, his exaggeration of the importance of geographic conditions, and Lenin's criticisms of his theoretical weaknesses. Plekhanov's treatment of the materialist conception of history still stands as one of the most brilliant and coherent presentations of this seminal doctrine. It is a pity and a historical deprivation that he became so preoccupied with the polemics of the day as to never sit down to write a systematic exposition of Marxism.--H. B. (shrink)

The fifteen selections in this volume are collected around the thesis that many of the foundations and tenets of empiricism are mistaken and must be either rejected outright or radically revised. To introduce these essays, Morick briefly traces the development of modern empiricism from what he considers its source in Hume’s theory of knowledge through the phenomenalist stage to the present conception of empiricism, one of whose basic principles continues to be the fundamental role of observation in the acquisition of (...) knowledge: perception provides the foundation of empirical knowledge. It is particularly this "foundation picture" which has been denounced by many contemporary critics of empiricism as both oversimplified and misleading. The critics, including those in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and scientists themselves, have proposed three related objections to this notion. The first is that rather than drawing a sharp distinction between observation claims and theoretical claims, observation claims must be understood in terms of a network of background assumptions. The second objection holds that it is this network of assumptions which bestows the very meaning on observation claims. Consequently, an observation term such as "red" will not maintain a fixed meaning throughout various changes in theories. Further, since the objection also covers observation words, the notion of ostensive words is rejected. The final objection is that our observations themselves should be looked upon as interpretations arising from these background assumptions rather than merely barren perceptions, isolated from one’s beliefs and preconceptions. The selections, most of which are well-known, specify these and other critical arguments and revisions. They are arranged into three slightly overlapping sections: "Empiricism and Ontology", "Empiricism and Science", and "Empiricism and Linguistics". Considering the purpose and scope of the book, the contributions have been appropriately chosen. An eight-page annotated bibliography is included.—B. G. H. (shrink)

Leibniz's earliest philosophy and its importance for his mature philosophy have not been examined in detail, particularly in the level of detail that one can achieve by placing Leibniz's philosophy in the context of the sources for two of the most basic concerns of his philosophical career: his metaphysics of individuals and the principle oftheir individuation. In this book I provide for the first time a detailed examination of these two Leibnizian themes and trace its implications for how we should (...) interpret other major Leibnizian themes and for how we should read Leibniz and other philosophers of the sixteenth and later centuries as 'modem' philosophers. Leibniz began his philosophical career more than 300 years ago, a fact that shapes fundamentally my attempt in the pages that follow to come to terms now with the texts that he left us. Leibniz's did not do philosophy in a way wholly congenial to twentieth century philosophical methodologies, especially those that have enjoyed some prominence in recent Anglo-American philosophy. Moreover, as we shall see, Leibniz is not a modem philosopher, when 'modem' is understood to mean making a sharp break with medieval philosophy. Indeed, I shall argue, scholars should discard such terms as 'modem' from historical philosophical scholarship, so that old texts can be allowed to remain old - to stand on their own in and from times now long past. (shrink)

De George undertakes the formidable task of compressing within 154 pages of text a description and critical analysis of the changes which have taken place in Marxist theory in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since the Twentieth Congress in 1956. The brevity of the book is its chief handicap detracting from what is otherwise a stimulating study of modern Marxism. The summary form of statement leads to some unsupported claims and to others which are ambiguous (...) because they lack development. Most of the space is devoted to the two extremes of Soviet and Yugoslav Marxism, with sketchy references to Poland and Hungary and scantier references to Czechoslovakia. East Germany and Rumania are dismissed in one sentence as puppet versions of Soviet Marxism. Among the interesting and provocative observations which would benefit from expanded treatment are: Contemporary Marxists in Eastern Europe view Marxism or Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy, not as a science. Even in the Soviet Union, where Marxism-Leninism is still considered a science, the term has been given a meaning distinct from the ordinary meaning of science. Theory and practice have become separated, although not divorced. The political leaders are not the theoreticians and the theoreticians are not the party spokesmen. The power centers are removed from the centers of theoretical activity. There is a continuity between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods which is not recognized or admitted by most Marxists. Stalin himself initiated some of the developments which are generally regarded as post-Stalinist features. The wide variety of interpretations of Marxism by contemporary Marxists in the countries under study indicates the vitality of the basic doctrine and its potential for further development. They also prove that Marxism need not go the way of Lenin and Stalin and that communism need not go the way of Soviet Russia.--H. B. (shrink)

This book is a rare piece of writing in any language. Its first merit is that it puts in 360-odd pages a concise and highly readable history of economic thought from Ricardo and Adam Smith to modern times as seen through the critical spectacles of classical Marxist political economy. Its second merit is that it does not dismiss capitalist economics as mere apologetics or mystification, but--in the genuine spirit of Marx's principles of criticism--it also seeks out the positive aspects of (...) methodology and understanding which can help clarify the workings and malfunctions of late twentieth century capitalism. Nor does the author bow before any mystic infallibility of current Soviet economic theory. Among the most interesting treatments are those of the theories of Böhm-Bawerk, Schumpeter, Marshall, Veblen, Hobson, Hilferding, Kalecki, Keynes, Harrod-Domar, Kaldor, Sraffa, Galbraith, Myrdal, Strachey, and Bettelheim. Aguilar is a professor of economics at the University of Mexico and displays impressive scholarship and perception in his chosen field. His call is for Latin American intellectuals to free themselves from the restrictions of the economic theories of capitalist economics and to dedicate themselves to the development of the theoretical foundations necessary for the liberation of Latin America not only from economic domination, but also from the cultural, social, and political tutelage of their economic masters. Marx's model of capitalism and Lenin's model of imperialism have not lost their power in Latin America as grounds for explaining the continued economic, cultural, social, and political backwardness of this huge area. The present work demonstrates the intellectual sweep of this power. The book is well-footnoted, but, deplorably, lacks an index.--H. B. (shrink)

In his first book on Marx, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, published in 1961, Tucker developed three main themes: Marx's philosophy is deeply rooted in the traditions of German philosophy from Kant to the neo-Hegelians; there is a fundamental continuity between the thought of the young Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the mature Marx of the Critique of Political Economy and Das Kapital; the missing clue for a full understanding of Marx, particularly of the apparently contradictory (...) presence of strong moral overtones in Marx's writings and the absence of any supporting philosophy of ethics, is that Marx was basically a utopian religious moralist with an eschatology that envisaged the redemption of man. These three themes are briefly and forcefully restated in the present book without change or qualification and serve as the springboard for extending Tucker's interpretation of Marx and Engels into new areas. The reference to Marx and Engels introduces another element common to both works. Unlike most non-Marxist scholars, Tucker treats Marx and Engels as harmonious collaborators in the fashioning of a single doctrine. The first hundred pages are studded with references to the joint views of both men and their differences in belief are mentioned perfunctorily. Six of the seven chapters in the book have appeared previously as individual essays. The new chapter is on the relevance of Marxism to the modernization theories of the contemporary social sciences. Two other chapters examine Marx and Engels' position on distributive justice and on the state and politics. The latter half of the book takes up Marxism as an ideology of revolutionary movements, with special stress on the appeal of Marxism to the intelligentsia of under-developed countries and on the theoretical contributions of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao tse-Tung. The sixth chapter is on the de-radicalization of Marxism in the USSR and the final chapter finds an enduring value in Marx's utopian "futurology" of a transformed mature humanity living in a transformed world.--H. B. (shrink)

A good and useful book with over 100 pages of appendices, bibliography and index, its utility perhaps will be due more to its qualities as a reference than as critique. The first of five parts sketches the background of pragmatism, concentrating on the problems of scientific knowledge. Part II gives a chapter each to Peirce, James, Dewey, Lewis, and G. H. Mead, emphasizing their answers to the problems of Part I. Part III treats pragmatism in Europe. Part IV is called (...) "Consequences." Here Thayer includes the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, a discussion of instrumentalism in philosophy of science, and he gives an exposition of Dewey's ethics. In Part V, "Speculations," the author lists attitudes and topics of renewed interest in contemporary philosophy which are characteristically pragmatic. This "Pragmatism" is a revolutionary shift in methodology and criticism. It finds that non-philosophical contexts are the initiating and terminating points of philosophical analysis, and it is tolerant of pluralism. The ethics of Dewey and Lewis, which stress the necessity for communication between philosophic valuation theory and the empirical sciences, are one expression of this "Pragmatism." The successes of an empirical philosophy which aims to account for originative thinking and valuing in either science or morals support Thayer's speculation that "the future may well be with Dewey, Lewis, and Mead."--M. B. M. (shrink)

This is Volume IV in the Evangelical Commentary on the Bible. As one might expect, the authors avoid novelty—which does not detract from the value of their work. A lengthy introduction provides a lucid summary of contemporary scholarship on the influence, distinctive features, background, problems, and text of the Fourth Gospel. The authors incline to the view that the Gospel is at least the "witness" of the Apostle John though the actual writing may have been done by a later "John (...) the Presbyter or an unnamed disciple." Each page of the commentary has four divisions: 1) text, 2) exegesis, 3) exposition, 4) footnotes. The exposition is intended to relate John's message to contemporary life and is, therefore, a useful preaching aid.—D. J. B. (shrink)